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Physical safety and operational security

The attack that does not need any code: somebody who knows you hold crypto.

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By the Orca Crypto teamUpdated 2026-09-01How we check this5 min read
The short answer

The attack that does not need any code: somebody who knows you hold crypto. Self custody removes the intermediary, which also removes the person who could freeze a transfer or reverse it. That makes a holder personally worth targeting. These attacks are rare relative to the online kind, but they are the ones where discretion is the entire defense.

What it is

Self custody removes the intermediary, which also removes the person who could freeze a transfer or reverse it. That makes a holder personally worth targeting. These attacks are rare relative to the online kind, but they are the ones where discretion is the entire defense.

How it plays out

  1. You are identified as a holder

    Usually because you said so, in public, under a name that can be tied to a place.

  2. The details get filled in

    From social media, from a leaked customer list, from a conference badge photo.

  3. The approach is direct

    Coercion in person, or a burglary aimed specifically at finding a seed phrase or a hardware wallet.

What gives it away

  • Being asked, in any social setting, how much crypto you hold.
  • Unusual interest in your travel, your address or your household.
  • A data breach at a hardware wallet or exchange that leaked customer addresses.

How to not be caught by it

  • Do not discuss holdings. Not amounts, not gains, not under a handle linked to your real name.
  • Keep the seed phrase somewhere that is not obviously a seed phrase, and not at your desk.
  • Consider splitting a backup across locations so no single place is enough.
  • Use a passphrase on a hardware wallet, so the device alone does not open the real balance.
  • Ship hardware wallets to a locker or a workplace rather than your home address.
  • Have a small decoy balance that can be handed over, and never mention the rest.
The hard part is not technical
None of these require technical skill to avoid. They require doing the boring check at the exact moment you feel most rushed, which is the whole difficulty.

If it already happened

  • Your safety is worth more than any balance. Hand it over.
  • Move remaining funds as soon as you are safe, assuming everything visible is compromised.
  • Report it to the police. These cases are investigated and patterns get connected.
Recovery scams
Anybody who contacts you offering to recover lost crypto for a fee is running the second scam on the same victim. There is no recovery service that can reverse a blockchain transaction, because nobody can. Report it through official channels and ignore everyone else.

Where to go next

Check your setup before you need to

An hour on a screen share, going through your wallets, your approvals, your backups and your recovery plan. You click everything and we never ask for keys.

Common questions

Am I actually at risk of this?
It is rare and it is real, and it correlates with being publicly identifiable as a holder. The practical answer is not to discuss holdings publicly, not to post about gains, and not to be findable as somebody with crypto.
What is a duress setup?
A second wallet with a small balance that can be handed over, kept separate from the main one. Some hardware wallets support a passphrase that opens a decoy account. It is worth understanding before you need it.
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